Dubai Metro
No cab, no driver, and 89.6 km of it. The Red and Green lines carried 275.4 million riders in 2024 at 99.7% punctuality, and a third line is due by 2029.
Driverless transport is simultaneously a mature, unremarkable technology and a decade-long pilot programme — depending entirely on whether it runs on a guideway or in traffic. Almost every disappointed expectation in this field comes from conflating the two.
The atlas holds 25 documented entries across 19 cities — but only 10 countries and two continents. That concentration in East Asia and the Gulf is real and worth stating plainly: driverless deployment at scale is not currently a global phenomenon.
| Environment | Status | Evidence in the atlas |
|---|---|---|
| Metro and light rail (segregated guideway) | Mature, carrying millions daily | Dubai: 275.4M riders in 2024 at 99.7% punctuality |
| Ports and terminals (private, fenced) | Commercially operating | Yangshan, Tianjin — operator-reported figures |
| Robotaxi zones (geofenced public roads) | Commercial but bounded | Shanghai, Guangzhou, Dubai |
| Street shuttles (mixed traffic, low speed) | Still piloting after ten years | Helsinki, Tokyo, Singapore |
Unattended metro operation (GoA4) is not experimental. Dubai's driverless metro has carried over 2.4 billion riders since 2009. Shanghai reported 167 km of driverless route across five lines by the end of 2021. Beijing's Yanfang line proved home-grown signalling in 2017; state media traced from it a wave reaching about 50 fully automated lines across 21 Chinese cities — roughly 1,480 km — by January 2025.
Chengdu's Line 9 contributes the most portable engineering lesson: launching straight at unattended operation, rather than retrofitting automation onto a driver-run line later, let obstacle and derailment sensing be designed into the fleet from the start. Retrofitting autonomy is consistently harder than starting with it.
Astana's LRT supplies the governance lesson. It opened driverless — after a decade of delay and a landmark corruption case in which the abandoned viaduct became a national symbol of graft. Automation was never the hard part of that project.
The contrast in commitment is stark, and both numbers are in the atlas. Beijing's Yizhuang demonstration area reports 38 million kilometres of cumulative autonomous test mileage, 35 test companies and 1,098 test plates as of mid-2025. The flagship EU-funded Sohjoa Baltic shuttle programme, across six cities and 19 months, carried 19,437 passengers in total — its Helsinki pilot 3,932.
Neither figure is embarrassing on its own terms. Together they explain why European cities keep concluding that shuttles "are not ready" while Chinese and Gulf cities report commercial services: the sample sizes differ by four orders of magnitude.
Even the newest street deployments stay bounded. Singapore's Punggol shuttle service runs with safety operators aboard. Tokyo's Marunouchi trial logged 420 rides across 69 runs in five days on a pedestrianised street. Amsterdam's Roboat, which set out to put autonomous vessels on the canals, is graded scaled-back: the research programme ended and the surviving commercial work is far more modest than the original vision.
Not one street-autonomy entry in this atlas carries independent or peer-reviewed evidence. Robotaxi ride counts come from operators; test mileage comes from the authority promoting the zone; terminal productivity comes from the port and its technology partner, explicitly not independently audited. This is normal for a young field — but it means comparative claims about safety or efficiency currently rest on the interested party's own accounting.
NEOM's The Line marks the outer edge of that problem: a 170-kilometre autonomous-mobility megastructure announced before engineering and financing were proven, now suspended at a 2.4-kilometre stub.
The practical takeaway: if a city wants driverless transport that carries people at scale today, the answer in this atlas is a metro. Street autonomy is advancing fastest where a single authority created a large fenced testbed and committed for years — and it remains, everywhere, a programme to evaluate rather than a service to buy.
Four automated rail systems and the question that separates the label from the reality. Two have genuinely nobody aboard — and two are the atlas's documented automation rollbacks, where the staff came back after a crash.
| Project | Since | Status | Outcome | Evidence | Run by | Cost | Who sits in the cab |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Santiago Metro Automation: Two Cabless Lines and CBTC on the RestSantiago, 🇨🇱 | 2017 | Live | Succeeded | Media | Utility or public operator | US$451.9M (2013 CAF-Thales trains and CBTC for lines 3 and 6) | No one — and no cab to sit in: the trains carry only a concealed console for manual recovery. |
| Réseau express métropolitain: a pension fund's driverless metroMontreal, 🇨🇦 | 2023 | Live | Ongoing | Independent | Utility or public operator, Private company | CA$8.34B construction (CDPQ Infra); ≈CA$9.4B project total (Auditor General, Nov 2024) | No one aboard since opening; the network is owned by a pension fund that is paid per passenger-kilometre. |
| Nanko Port Town Line (New Tram) Driverless GuidewayOsaka, 🇯🇵 | 1981 | Live | Succeeded | Official | Utility or public operator | not public | Automated in 1981, staff back aboard after the October 1993 runaway, unattended again only from 2000. |
| Washington Metro's automatic train operation, switched off for 15 yearsWashington D.C., 🇺🇸 | 1976 | Live | Ongoing | Official | Utility or public operator | not public | Self-driving from 1976, switched to manual within about a day of the 2009 Fort Totten crash — automation returned line by line only from December 2024. |