Permanent project revision

112 Georgia: The Emergency Number That Also Runs the Cameras

Revision 2026-11-04-baseline · effective 2026-11-04

Current revision. This is the snapshot used by the live entity page.

unreviewed

Created the first structured Evidence Passport with 18 claims and 7 source dossiers.

sha256:8f89dbbbf4cad96f2a5ea4af9507fc8b415069fa79bf8106971c38ad7401795e

Change set

  • add /evidencePassport — Added claim-level evidence mapping and source dossiers.
  • add /revisionHistory — Established a permanent, hash-addressed baseline revision.
18
of 18 claims mapped
7
source dossiers
6
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Claims, one by one

The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.

Claim 1 clm-1783857cb10ba9cd quantitative
answered by a public-law entity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, set up under a law of 24 November 2011
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The 2019 law names and repeals the law of 24 November 2011 that established '112' as a public-law entity of the Interior Ministry.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019)
Claim 2 clm-dcde691ab5259852 quantitative
Since 31 December 2019 the old '112' and the ministry's Joint Operations Center have been one body, the Public Safety Command Center 112
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The transitional provisions reorganise '112' and the Joint Operations Center into the Center 112; the core articles take effect from 31 December 2019.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019)
Claim 3 clm-2124ef5c7a91c486 quantitative
gives it 24-hour video surveillance of the whole country through video analytical programmes, used to identify offences, wanted persons and vehicles
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
Article 4 assigns the centre 24-hour video surveillance of the whole country through video analytical programmes and, on that basis, the identification of crimes, wanted persons and vehicles, and administrative offences.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019)
Claim 4 clm-2c5246fd10cb0d47 quantitative
A mobile app presented in February 2018 sends the caller's location and adds a silent SOS alarm and a chat with the operator
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The report says 112 presented an app that determines the location of the person asking for help, with a silent SOS alarm and a chat with the operator.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. The Messenger — Georgia's Emergency Service Launches New Mobile Application (13 Feb 2018)
Claim 5 clm-1967ec241739e07a descriptive
In Tbilisi, the cameras on Rustaveli Avenue are the centre's
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The data protection service describes the cameras on Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi, as the ones through which the Public Safety Command Center 112 processes biometric data.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. InterPressNews — Personal Data Protection Service: investigation into 112's biometric data processing has begun (12 Mar 2025)
Claim 6 clm-379f4b65ad9b6d4e descriptive
State oversight of the centre lies with the ministry
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
Article 12 of the law gives state oversight of the centre to the Interior Ministry.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019)
Claim 7 clm-01c051ebad778f3b quantitative
the only timing figure on record is the centre's own: 1.5 minutes on average to send a response, mostly spent locating the caller
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The review quotes a 112 representative giving the 1.5-minute average and saying most of the time goes on locating the caller.
Caveat
The figure is the centre's own statement to the reviewer, given in 2017, not a measurement the reviewer made; no other source in this entry measures response times.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Open Government Partnership IRM — Georgia Progress Report 2016-2017
Claim 8 clm-327d3f6a7c74ee6f quantitative
After 115 cameras on and around Rustaveli Avenue were damaged between 28 November and 4 December 2024
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
GYLA cites a letter from the centre's director reporting 115 cameras on and around Rustaveli Avenue damaged during the protests between 28 November and 4 December. The statement, published in February 2025, concerns the protests of late 2024.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. GYLA — Call on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the Interior Ministry's facial recognition cameras (10 Feb 2025)
Claim 9 clm-c4426a568fa05698 quantitative
the centre bought 30 facial and emotion recognition cameras, according to the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
GYLA states, citing public sources, that the Public Safety Command Center 112 bought 30 facial and emotion recognition cameras.
Caveat
GYLA relies on media reporting for the purchase; the ministry's own procurement record is not among this entry's sources.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. GYLA — Call on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the Interior Ministry's facial recognition cameras (10 Feb 2025)
Claim 10 clm-45832329d38001c1 descriptive
photos from facial recognition cameras often served as the only evidence in road-blocking offence cases
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
GYLA reports that in proceedings over road blocking, photos from facial recognition cameras often serve as the only evidence.
Caveat
This is the finding of a lawyers' association that represents protesters, drawn from the cases it handled.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. GYLA — Call on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the Interior Ministry's facial recognition cameras (10 Feb 2025)
Claim 11 clm-abc33c794b73dcc2 quantitative
The Personal Data Protection Service opened an unplanned inspection of the centre's biometric processing on Rustaveli Avenue on 18 February 2025
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The regulator's statement dates the inspection to 18 February 2025 and names the centre's biometric processing through the Rustaveli Avenue cameras as one of two subjects.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. InterPressNews — Personal Data Protection Service: investigation into 112's biometric data processing has begun (12 Mar 2025)
Claim 12 clm-cc7f3bcd808df367 descriptive
the service never responded substantively to the association's request
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The institute states that the data protection service failed to respond substantively to GYLA's February 2025 request.
Caveat
The institute is a Georgian NGO critical of the government; no ruling from the inspection is among this entry's sources either way.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Democracy Research Institute — Biometric Surveillance and Tracking in Georgia (1 Jul 2026)
Claim 13 clm-47d4ca23e539a55c quantitative
it was abolished effective 2 March 2026, its functions transferred to the State Audit Office
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The institute reports Parliament's abolition of the Personal Data Protection Service effective 2 March 2026 and the transfer of its functions to the State Audit Office.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Democracy Research Institute — Biometric Surveillance and Tracking in Georgia (1 Jul 2026)
Claim 14 clm-32d54424efd5c762 quantitative
the ministry ran 9,822 cameras in its Safe City programme as of April 2026
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The institute gives the count, citing the ministry's own published data, for the 'Safe City, Safe Region, Safe Country' programme.
Caveat
The count is the ministry's, relayed by the institute; it covers the whole country, not Tbilisi alone.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Democracy Research Institute — Biometric Surveillance and Tracking in Georgia (1 Jul 2026)
Claim 15 clm-1f23cd87ad08d6fd descriptive
The law that did so tells the centre to identify offences from video and leaves its oversight with the ministry it belongs to
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The law assigns identification of offences from video (Article 4) and oversight by the ministry (Article 12).
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019)
Claim 16 clm-0148d598180491fe quantitative
a data protection inspection opened in February 2025, produced no substantive response before the regulator itself was abolished
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The regulator's statement dates the inspection to February 2025; the institute reports no substantive response and the regulator's abolition effective 2 March 2026.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. InterPressNews — Personal Data Protection Service: investigation into 112's biometric data processing has begun (12 Mar 2025)
  2. Democracy Research Institute — Biometric Surveillance and Tracking in Georgia (1 Jul 2026)
Claim 17 clm-e98f67aaded18a24 descriptive
a peer-reviewed study notes that Georgia has no response-time standards for emergency medical services
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The study's introduction states that Georgia does not have EMS response-time standards.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Elizbarashvili et al. — GIS served ambulance arrival time in the Kvemo Kartli region, Georgia (JIPD, 8 Aug 2024)
Claim 18 clm-c9d715dd322c3314 descriptive
an Open Government Partnership review recommended that the centre proactively disclose statistics of calls and responses
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this file
What the mapping says
The IRM researcher recommends that 112 proactively disclose statistics of calls and responses if the commitment is carried into the next action plan.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Open Government Partnership IRM — Georgia Progress Report 2016-2017

Source dossiers and revision state

This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.

unreviewed Revision 2026-11-04-baseline effective 2026-11-04 · created 2026-11-04

Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.

sha256:8f89dbbbf4cad96f2a5ea4af9507fc8b415069fa79bf8106971c38ad7401795e
18
of 18 claims mapped
7
source dossiers
6
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Governance facts carried by the record

Operator
Public Safety Command Center 112, a public-law entity under Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (successor since 31 December 2019 to the '112' entity and the ministry's Joint Operations Center)
Actor types
national-government
Funding model
public
Funding description
Target funds from Georgia's state budget plus a service fee the 2019 law allows the government to set at GEL 0.20 to GEL 0.50 a month per subscriber number, collected by telecom operators.
Cost
Not recorded
Ownership
Not recorded
Decision rights
Not recorded
Exit conditions
Not recorded

7 source dossiers

Legislative Herald of Georgia — Law on the Public Safety Command Center 112 (24 Dec 2019) matsne.gov.ge · 5 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-76f36aa6075c25d5
Publisher
Name not classified · matsne.gov.ge
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2019-12-24
Updated
2021-06-14
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The consolidated English text of the law. It merges the old '112' entity and the ministry's Joint Operations Center into the Public Safety Command Center 112 from 31 December 2019, tasks it with receiving 112 calls and with 24-hour video surveillance of the whole country through video analytical programmes, lets it identify offences, wanted persons and vehicles from video, allows a monthly fee of GEL 0.20 to GEL 0.50 per subscriber number, places state oversight with the ministry, and repeals the law of 24 November 2011 that established '112'.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
The Messenger — Georgia's Emergency Service Launches New Mobile Application (13 Feb 2018) messenger.com.ge · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-5f9650824e0980d1
Publisher
Name not classified · messenger.com.ge
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2018-02-13
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Report that 112 presented a free mobile app that determines the location of the person asking for help, with a silent alarm (SOS) and a chat with the operator, in Georgian, English and Russian.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Open Government Partnership IRM — Georgia Progress Report 2016-2017 opengovpartnership.org · 2 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-0d52d39b41a7354b
Publisher
Name not classified · opengovpartnership.org
Type / language
pdf · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The Open Government Partnership's Independent Reporting Mechanism review of Georgia's 2016-2018 action plan, which included the 112 app as a commitment. It quotes a 112 representative that sending a response takes 1.5 minutes on average, most of it lost on locating the caller, rates the app's potential impact as minor, and recommends that 112 proactively disclose statistics of calls and responses. The report carries no publication date of its own.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
GYLA — Call on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the Interior Ministry's facial recognition cameras (10 Feb 2025) gyla.ge · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-ec96863a00759832
Publisher
Name not classified · gyla.ge
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2025-02-10
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Statement by the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association: photos from facial recognition cameras often serve as the only evidence in road-blocking offence cases against protesters; the Public Safety Command Center 112 bought 30 facial and emotion recognition cameras after its director reported 115 cameras on and around Rustaveli Avenue damaged between 28 November and 4 December; asks the data protection regulator to inspect.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
InterPressNews — Personal Data Protection Service: investigation into 112's biometric data processing has begun (12 Mar 2025) interpressnews.ge · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-099b79f326f80741
Publisher
Name not classified · interpressnews.ge
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2025-03-12
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The Personal Data Protection Service's statement that on 18 February 2025 it opened an unplanned inspection of the legality of biometric data processing by the Public Safety Command Center 112 through cameras on Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi, and could give no preliminary assessment before completion.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Democracy Research Institute — Biometric Surveillance and Tracking in Georgia (1 Jul 2026) democracyresearch.org · 4 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-77e976ec6c3665c0
Publisher
Name not classified · democracyresearch.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2026-07-01
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Analysis by a Georgian NGO. Citing the ministry's own data, it puts the network at 9,822 cameras in the 'Safe City, Safe Region, Safe Country' programme as of April 2026; says protest-related arrests relied on biometric matching through the '112' unified video surveillance system; reports that the data protection service failed to respond substantively to GYLA's request and was abolished effective 2 March 2026, its functions transferred to the State Audit Office.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Elizbarashvili et al. — GIS served ambulance arrival time in the Kvemo Kartli region, Georgia (JIPD, 8 Aug 2024) doi.org · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-037adacc1f840ceb
Publisher
Name not classified · doi.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-08-08
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-11-04
Dossier created
2026-11-04
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Peer-reviewed GIS study of ambulance arrival times in the Kvemo Kartli region by Tbilisi State University researchers. It states that Georgia does not have response-time standards for emergency medical services; its measurements concern Kvemo Kartli, not Tbilisi.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Known limits of this file
  • Publisher names and source languages have not yet been classified; domains are recorded without guessing.
  • Existing source notes are descriptive locators, not page- or paragraph-exact citations.
  • A missing archive, publication date or content hash is shown as null rather than inferred.
  • The project-level evidence grade ranks the strongest source in the entry; it is not a truth score for every claim.