clm-a6e5dafeb1e1fa50
quantitative
9,392,372 biometric queries to RENAPER between 25 April 2019 and 20 December 2021, plus 507,911 more to 9 March 2022, covering about 7.5 million people
Permanent project revision
Revision 2026-08-20-source-dates-b2 · effective 2026-07-26
Superseded. A later revision exists: 2026-08-20-source-dates-r2 →
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sha256:1af0af64154da44f4f92218b9a359383dfebe318f6fbb177f3c36d77920822df
replace /snapshot/projectFingerprint — Updated projectFingerprint to the current sourced project record.replace /snapshot/sources — Updated sources to the current sourced project record.The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.
clm-a6e5dafeb1e1fa50
quantitative
9,392,372 biometric queries to RENAPER between 25 April 2019 and 20 December 2021, plus 507,911 more to 9 March 2022, covering about 7.5 million people
This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.
Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.
sha256:1af0af64154da44f4f92218b9a359383dfebe318f6fbb177f3c36d77920822df
src-5a008cea7acdd15b9 Oct 2020. Sources the launch date ("began operating on April 24, 2019"), the ~300-camera deployment inside a network of nearly 13,000, and the mechanism: CONARC "lacks photographs of charged individuals, so the system pulls reference images from Argentina's population registry." Also the minors finding — "at least 166 children have been listed in CONARC between May 2017 and May 2020" — against the city's denial that CONARC held data on minors. Fetched successfully.
src-4a06621e66b52f31Independent Argentine fact-checking outlet. Carries the city's own claim verbatim — "1.695 personas fueron identificadas y puestas a disposición de la Justicia" — alongside the court's finding of "más de 9 millones de consultas" against a CONARC of "entre 35 mil y 40 mil registros", and the searches for the President, Vice-President, politicians, activists, judges and journalists. Fetched successfully.
src-c6b5cb3942701c5aDates the precautionary suspension to 12 April 2022 and names Judge Roberto Andrés Gallardo, Juzgado CAyT y de Relaciones de Consumo Nº 2. Other video-surveillance systems were left running; forensic audits of the equipment used to hold the migrated RENAPER data were ordered. Fetched successfully.
src-cbf1f9faf68b19c2Litigant NGO, so read as a party — but it is the clearest statement of the grounds: the Comisión Especial de Seguimiento was never constituted in the Legislature, the Defensoría del Pueblo produced no reports, and no impact assessment preceded deployment. Dates the first-instance ruling 7 September 2022 (Judge Elena Liberatori). Fetched successfully. Date caveat: El Cohete a la Luna gives 28 September and the law firm Marval dates the judgment 26 October 2022 — the entry therefore says "September 2022" rather than a day.
src-4c18dd5a3e423eaaIndependent legal analysis of the judgment; the sentence-level source for the exact figures used in impact — "9,392,372" biometric requests to RENAPER and "at least 15,459" searches of non-fugitives — and for the statutory frame (Leyes 5.688 and 6.339, Convention 108, art. 43 of the national Constitution). Also records the city's position that there were no wrongful detentions, against the Public Defender's documented one-to-three-hour detentions from false positives. Fetched successfully.
src-fa52265be06569f4Chamber I of the Court of Appeals, 28 April 2023, rejecting the appeals of the city government and the public prosecutor. Sets the three conditions on any restart: "establishment and proper functioning of oversight bodies", investigation of "differentiated impact depending on the personal features", and that the "system should be publicized and its operation should be reported". Fetched successfully.
src-af038f8fd0629145Law-firm analysis, used for the instruments actually applied: national data protection Law 25.326, the city's public-sector data protection Law 1.845, and Convention 108, plus the requirement of a data protection impact assessment before any re-implementation. Dates the judgment 26 October 2022, which conflicts with CELS and FPF — flagged rather than reconciled. Fetched successfully.
src-faa2431a6cf7f68e19 Feb 2024, opinion/analysis. Confirms the system was still suspended and that an execution-of-judgment hearing was being held to fix audit conditions; notes the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy asked for an impact assessment during a visit. A vendor name (Danaide) appears here only and was not carried into the entry. Fetched successfully.
src-e60817a15d3b52b212 Oct 2025 — the most recent confirmation located that the SRFP remains halted, and the clearest account of why: a deadlock over audit method, the city offering a black-box audit without source-code access while civil society demands scrutiny for bias and vulnerabilities. Politically committed outlet; used for status and the audit dispute, not for figures. Fetched successfully.
src-e42b65b8a3725fd37 Oct 2025. Kept for one negative finding that prevents a false 'restart' claim: the 2025 facial-recognition purchase in Buenos Aires (Clearview AI, US$27,588) was made by the Ministerio Público Fiscal for images already in evidence, a different body and a different use from the SRFP's live street matching. Fetched successfully.