1001 Smart Cities
🇦🇷 Buenos Aires

Buenos Aires's Fugitive Facial Recognition System, stopped by the courts

🤖 AI-generated summary · ◆ 18 sourced claims · 🔎 Last verified

This overview was generated with AI from the public sources listed below and checked against them before publication. It has not had a complete human fact-check — treat it as a starting point and follow the sources.

18 sourced claims on this page, none individually verified yet — turn on “Sources in the text” to see each one.

How this atlas is made · What “last verified” means · What “source-checked” means · The full record behind this page

✎ Updated 23 Aug 2026 1 source added. · 3 revisions in all What changed →

The city says the cameras put 1,695 people in the hands of the courts. The judicial file showed the ministry had queried some 7.5 million faces against a fugitive list of 35,000-40,000.

Outcome🪦 Failed
Evidence📊 Independent
what does this mean?The strongest source is an independent non-academic evaluation: an audit office, a government or EU review, or an NGO. It grades who did the looking — not how well the project went. All four grades →
Run byMinisterio de Justicia y Seguridad, Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
Scale🏙️ City-wide

Part of 1001 Smart Cities — 1,167 documented projects · 🏙️ 10 more in Buenos Aires · 🛡️ Safety & security guide · 🏛️ Governance projects

The city switched on the Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de Prófugos on 24 April 2019, matching live feeds from about 300 of its cameras, in Subte stations and on the street, against CONARC, the national fugitives list. CONARC carries names & ID numbers but no photographs, so reference faces were drawn from the national identity registry, RENAPER. The city says the system put 1,695 people in the hands of the courts; the judicial file showed the security ministry had pulled roughly 9.9 million biometric records covering some 7.5 million people, among them journalists, politicians, judges and activists. A city judge suspended it in April 2022, a second declared its implementation unconstitutional in September 2022, and the appeals court confirmed that on 28 April 2023. It has not run since.

Suspended 📅 since 2019 🤖 Uses AI

📊 Impact

City figure: 1,695 people identified and handed to the courts, April 2019 to April 2022 (Buenos Aires city government, via Chequeado). Court record: 9,392,372 biometric queries to RENAPER between 25 April 2019 and 20 December 2021, plus 507,911 more to 9 March 2022, covering about 7.5 million people — against a CONARC list of 35,000-40,000 — including at least 15,459 searches of people not on that list.

🎓 Lesson

A statutory limit is only worth the body that enforces it. The law confined the system to people on CONARC, but the Legislature's oversight commission was never seated and the ombudsman's audit never happened, so the nine million queries surfaced only once a court demanded the logs.

🏛️ GovernanceSafety & securityArtificial intelligenceSensors & IoTPublic spacePrivacy & personal data

Sources

↗ Human Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rightsPublished 9 October 20209 Oct 2020. Sources the launch date ("began operating on April 24, 2019"), the ~300-camera deployment inside a network of nearly 13,000, and the mechanism: CONARC "lacks photographs of charged individuals, so the system pulls reference images from Argentina's population registry." Also the minors finding — "at least 166 children have been listed in CONARC between May 2017 and May 2020" — against the city's denial that CONARC held data on minors. Fetched successfully.
↗ Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos AiresPublished 21 April 2022Independent Argentine fact-checking outlet. Carries the city's own claim verbatim — "1.695 personas fueron identificadas y puestas a disposición de la Justicia" — alongside the court's finding of "más de 9 millones de consultas" against a CONARC of "entre 35 mil y 40 mil registros", and the searches for the President, Vice-President, politicians, activists, judges and journalists. Fetched successfully.
↗ iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugosPublished 12 April 2022 archived copyDates the precautionary suspension to 12 April 2022 and names Judge Roberto Andrés Gallardo, Juzgado CAyT y de Relaciones de Consumo Nº 2. Other video-surveillance systems were left running; forensic audits of the equipment used to hold the migrated RENAPER data were ordered. Fetched successfully.
↗ CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABAPublished 7 September 2022Litigant NGO, so read as a party — but it is the clearest statement of the grounds: the Comisión Especial de Seguimiento was never constituted in the Legislature, the Defensoría del Pueblo produced no reports, and no impact assessment preceded deployment. Dates the first-instance ruling 7 September 2022 (Judge Elena Liberatori). Fetched successfully. Date caveat: El Cohete a la Luna gives 28 September and the law firm Marval dates the judgment 26 October 2022 — the entry therefore says "September 2022" rather than a day.
↗ Future of Privacy Forum — Judge declares Buenos Aires' Fugitive Facial Recognition System unconstitutionalPublished 30 September 2022Independent legal analysis of the judgment; the sentence-level source for the exact figures used in impact — "9,392,372" biometric requests to RENAPER and "at least 15,459" searches of non-fugitives — and for the statutory frame (Leyes 5.688 and 6.339, Convention 108, art. 43 of the national Constitution). Also records the city's position that there were no wrongful detentions, against the Public Defender's documented one-to-three-hour detentions from false positives. Fetched successfully.
Show 6 more sourcesShow fewer
↗ CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFPPublished 29 April 2023Chamber I of the Court of Appeals, 28 April 2023, rejecting the appeals of the city government and the public prosecutor. Sets the three conditions on any restart: "establishment and proper functioning of oversight bodies", investigation of "differentiated impact depending on the personal features", and that the "system should be publicized and its operation should be reported". Fetched successfully.
↗ Marval O'Farrell Mairal — Se declara inconstitucional el Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de PrófugosPublished 26 October 2022Law-firm analysis, used for the instruments actually applied: national data protection Law 25.326, the city's public-sector data protection Law 1.845, and Convention 108, plus the requirement of a data protection impact assessment before any re-implementation. Dates the judgment 26 October 2022, which conflicts with CELS and FPF — flagged rather than reconciled. Fetched successfully.
↗ elDiarioAR — La Justicia define si vuelve el reconocimiento facial en las calles de Buenos AiresPublished 19 February 202419 Feb 2024, opinion/analysis. Confirms the system was still suspended and that an execution-of-judgment hearing was being held to fix audit conditions; notes the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy asked for an impact assessment during a visit. A vendor name (Danaide) appears here only and was not carried into the entry. Fetched successfully.
↗ El Cohete a la Luna — El panóptico porteñoPublished 12 October 202512 Oct 2025 — the most recent confirmation located that the SRFP remains halted, and the clearest account of why: a deadlock over audit method, the city offering a black-box audit without source-code access while civil society demands scrutiny for bias and vulnerabilities. Politically committed outlet; used for status and the audit dispute, not for figures. Fetched successfully.
↗ El Grito del Sur — La Ciudad reaviva el ojo electrónico: reconocimiento facial y control social en CABAPublished 7 October 20257 Oct 2025. Kept for one negative finding that prevents a false 'restart' claim: the 2025 facial-recognition purchase in Buenos Aires (Clearview AI, US$27,588) was made by the Ministerio Público Fiscal for images already in evidence, a different body and a different use from the SRFP's live street matching. Fetched successfully.
↗ Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) — #ConMiCaraNoPublished 23 May 2019Argentine civil-liberties organisation writing one month after launch, and the source for what the 300 cameras actually covered: they ran "en simultáneo" across "estaciones de la red de subtes como en la superficie" — subway stations and the surface alike, not the subway first.

📅 How old is the evidence?

Two clocks, kept apart: when this entry’s sources were published, and what has happened to its record in the atlas. Documented span: since 2019. 11 of 11 sources carry a publication date, from 23 May 2019 to 12 October 2025.

When the sources were published

  1. Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) · ngoAsociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) — #ConMiCaraNo
  2. Human Rights Watch · ngoHuman Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rights
  3. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires) · judiciaryiJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  4. Chequeado · pressChequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
  5. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) · ngoCELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA
  6. Future of Privacy Forum · ngoFuture of Privacy Forum — Judge declares Buenos Aires' Fugitive Facial Recognition System unconstitutional
  7. Marval O'Farrell Mairal · pressMarval O'Farrell Mairal — Se declara inconstitucional el Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de Prófugos
  8. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) · ngoCELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP
Show 3 more dated sourcesShow fewer
  1. elDiarioAR · presselDiarioAR — La Justicia define si vuelve el reconocimiento facial en las calles de Buenos Aires
  2. El Grito del Sur · pressEl Grito del Sur — La Ciudad reaviva el ojo electrónico: reconocimiento facial y control social en CABA
  3. El Cohete a la Luna · pressEl Cohete a la Luna — El panóptico porteño

Every source, with links ↑

What happened to this record

  1. Sources last read
  2. Entered the record
  3. Publication date recorded for 1 source
  4. Publication date recorded for 10 sources
  5. 1 source added

Every revision, permanent →

Show your work What this page rests on and what it can’t tell you · all 18 claims with their sources · the forensic record

Evidence Passport · public beta 18 addressable claims, 11 source dossiers, one permanent baseline. The passport is unreviewed — an AI-assisted structural migration, not a human or expert endorsement. Every revision keeps a permanent copy under revision history.

Inspect the claims, one by one — verbatim text, sources and caveats for all 18

The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.

Claim 1 clm-7d0899861cb0f87d quantitative
The city switched on the Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de Prófugos on 24 April 2019, matching live feeds from about 300 of its cameras
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Human Rights Watch dates the start of operations to that day and gives the camera count: "Since April 24, 2019, the city government of Buenos Aires has used the CONARC data—including the data on children—in its facial recognition system", and "The SRFP is currently deployed for simultaneous use on 300 CCTV cameras at a time", within a wider network reported to be "almost 13,000" cameras.
Caveat
The court file dates the launch one day later, to 25 April 2019, when Resolution 398/2019 was published; the query period recorded by the national registry in the same file also begins on 25 April 2019.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Human Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rights
Claim 2 clm-a5a6999d91b4ff7e descriptive
in Subte stations and on the street
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
ADC, writing a month after the launch, describes the 300 cameras as operating simultaneously in "estaciones de la red de subtes como en la superficie" — subway stations and the surface — rather than in a staged sequence.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) — #ConMiCaraNo
Claim 3 clm-bd698eae3fe64f36 descriptive
against CONARC, the national fugitives list
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The letter identifies CONARC as a national database held by the federal government: "Argentina's Justice and Human Rights Ministry maintains a national database...known as the Consulta Nacional de Rebeldías y Capturas (CONARC; National Reference of Fugitives and Arrests)." It is a national register, not a city one.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Human Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rights
Claim 4 clm-1a1fb6f3647bbd6e descriptive
CONARC carries names & ID numbers but no photographs, so reference faces were drawn from the national identity registry, RENAPER
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Human Rights Watch states the mechanism directly: "Because CONARC does not include photos of those charged with a crime, the SRFP pulls reference photos from the country's population registry." The injunction linked from the judiciary's report quotes the system's own operators describing the join and the fields CONARC does carry: "la CONARC nos da datos que se actualizan todos los días a las 7 de la mañana y nosotros tenemos los datos filiatorios, DNI, tipo de causa, juzgado" and "el dato biométrico lo macheamos con el RENAPER".
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Human Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rights
  2. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
Claim 5 clm-45cea9ed56093991 quantitative
The city says the system put 1,695 people in the hands of the courts
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The outlet attributes the figure explicitly to the city government rather than to any audit: "Según informaron a este medio desde el Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, desde la puesta en marcha del sistema, 1.695 personas fueron identificadas y puestas a disposición de la Justicia."
Caveat
This is the city government's own count, supplied to the outlet. No independent verification of it appears in the case file.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Claim 6 clm-e5eaabce31e78730 quantitative
the judicial file showed the security ministry had pulled roughly 9.9 million biometric records covering some 7.5 million people
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The injunction linked from the judiciary's report gives the total: "ESTO ES, UN TOTAL DE EXTRACCIONES DE 9.900.282 EN MENOS DE DOS AÑOS, DENTRO DE LOS QUE EL SRFP SE HABRÍA ENCONTRADO MAYORMENTE INACTIVO", and elsewhere records that "el Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad extrajo 9.392.372 veces datos biométricos al ReNaPer". CELS supplies the number of people behind those queries: "La Policía de la Ciudad hizo casi 10 millones de consultas sobre 7,5 millones de personas."
Caveat
The 9.9 million total is stated in the injunction itself, which is the PDF linked from this page rather than the article text. The figure of 7.5 million people is not in the order; it comes from CELS's account of the same file, which attributes the queries to the City Police where the order attributes them to the city's justice and security ministry.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  2. CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA
Claim 7 clm-f840a61c77256fef descriptive
among them journalists, politicians, judges and activists
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The outlet names people in each of the four groups whose data was queried: "el Presidente y la Vicepresidenta de la Nación; otros políticos del oficialismo y la oposición como la presidenta del PRO Patricia Bullrich y la diputada Myriam Bregman (FIT); dirigentes sociales como Juan Grabois y de Derechos Humanos como Estela De Carlotto y Hebe de Bonafini; ... funcionarios judiciales como el juez de la Corte Suprema Carlos Rosenkrantz; y periodistas como Gustavo Sylvestre y Eduardo Feinmann".
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Claim 8 clm-5823b8adb8f3d31b quantitative
A city judge suspended it in April 2022
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The city judiciary's own report dates the precautionary measure to 12 April 2022 and names the judge: "El titular del Juzgado n.° 2 del fuero Contencioso Administrativo, Tributario y de Relaciones de Consumo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Andrés Gallardo". He decided "ordenar al GCBA suspender el Sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos (SRFP), en el ámbito de la CABA, sin que ello merme de ninguna manera los restantes sistemas de videovigilancia, monitoreo urbano preventivo forense".
Caveat
This was an interim injunction rather than a final ruling, and it reached only the fugitive facial recognition system: the order expressly left the city's other video-surveillance and urban-monitoring systems running.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
Claim 9 clm-37ce95e86f2a104d quantitative
a second declared its implementation unconstitutional in September 2022
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
CELS reports that "La jueza en lo Contencioso Administrativo de la Ciudad, Elena Amanda Liberatori" declared the implementation unconstitutional, and its English account confirms both the month and that the finding attached to the implementation: the appeal court "upheld City Administrative Judge Elena Liberatori's decision in September 2022, which stated that the SRFP was implemented without due protection of inhabitants' rights."
Caveat
The ruling struck down the way the system was implemented, not the technology as such. The exact day is unsettled: CELS gives 7 September 2022 while the law-firm note dates the judgment 26 October 2022, which is why only the month is named.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA
  2. CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP
Claim 10 clm-910a9dea6266baa3 quantitative
the appeals court confirmed that on 28 April 2023
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
CELS reports the confirmation and its date: "a ruling that was confirmed by the Court of Appeals on April 28." It identifies the bench and the losing parties: "Chamber I rejected the appeals submitted by the City Government and the Public Prosecutor's Office". The court did not simply endorse a ban; it set conditions before any restart, the first being "Establishment and proper functioning of oversight bodies".
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP
Claim 11 clm-16024a3d470cb31e descriptive
It has not run since.
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Writing in October 2025, the outlet reports the system is still not operating and explains why: "El Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de Prófugos permanece suspendido debido a un punto muerto" — the city offering "una auditoría de 'caja negra' (sin acceso al código fuente)" while civil society demands deeper scrutiny.
Caveat
The courts did not outlaw the technology outright: they barred a restart until oversight conditions are met, and El Grito del Sur notes that narrowly defined use with a prior judicial order was later allowed. What the sources establish is that the live street-matching system has stayed switched off.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. El Cohete a la Luna — El panóptico porteño
Claim 12 clm-e460813badeda412 quantitative
1,695 people identified and handed to the courts, April 2019 to April 2022 (Buenos Aires city government, via Chequeado)
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The outlet carries the city's own figure and its attribution: "Según informaron a este medio desde el Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, desde la puesta en marcha del sistema, 1.695 personas fueron identificadas y puestas a disposición de la Justicia." The article was published on 21 April 2022, days after the suspension.
Caveat
The source says only "since the system was switched on" and names no end date. The April 2022 endpoint is the date of the article itself, not a period the city stated.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Claim 13 clm-a6e5dafeb1e1fa50 quantitative
9,392,372 biometric queries to RENAPER between 25 April 2019 and 20 December 2021, plus 507,911 more to 9 March 2022, covering about 7.5 million people
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The injunction reproduces the national registry's own report verbatim: "SEGÚN LO INFORMADO POR EL RENAPER, LAS SOLICITUDES DE DATOS BIOMÉTRICOS EFECTUADAS POR EL GCBA ENTRE EL 25/04/2019 Y 20/12/2021 FUERON 9.392.372 Y ENTRE EL 21/12/2021 Y EL 09/03/2022 FUERON 507.911." The second period begins on 21 December 2021, the day after the first ends, so the two do not overlap. The count of people behind the queries is CELS's: "casi 10 millones de consultas sobre 7,5 millones de personas".
Caveat
Both figures sit in the injunction PDF linked from this page, not in the article text on the page itself. The 7.5 million people figure does not appear in the order at all; it comes from CELS's reading of the same file.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  2. CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA
Claim 14 clm-6bfd336557cda67a quantitative
against a CONARC list of 35,000-40,000
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The injunction states: "LAS PERSONAS INCLUIDAS EN LA CONARC AL 25/04/2019 ERAN APROXIMADAMENTE 35.000 Y AL MOMENTO DE LA CONTESTACIÓN DEL OFICIO ASCENDÍA A APROXIMADAMENTE 40.000 REGISTROS". Chequeado gives the same span: "mientras la base de la Co.Na.R.C (rebeldías y capturas) tiene entre 35 mil y 40 mil registros".
Caveat
The two numbers are not a range measured at one moment: 35,000 is the size of the list when the system launched in April 2019, and 40,000 its size when the national registry answered the court.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  2. Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Claim 15 clm-25b6997506ed0b6a quantitative
including at least 15,459 searches of people not on that list
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The analysis of the September 2022 judgment states: "at least 15,459 search records in the SRFP were about individuals that were not included in the CONARC registries". CELS's English account gives the rounder form of the same finding: "the system was used illegally to search for more than 15,000 people who were not listed as fugitives".
Caveat
This precise figure is not in the April 2022 injunction; it comes from the September 2022 judgment as reported in this analysis.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Future of Privacy Forum — Judge declares Buenos Aires' Fugitive Facial Recognition System unconstitutional
Claim 16 clm-c814e10468469910 descriptive
The law confined the system to people on CONARC
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The injunction quotes the governing article of Law 5.688 as amended: "[s]alvo orden judicial, se encuentra prohibido incorporar imágenes, datos biométricos y/o registros de personas que no se encuentren registradas en el CONARC" (art. 485 bis). CELS states the same limit plainly: "By law, the SRFP must be used exclusively to search for people on that list."
Caveat
The statute allowed one exception the sentence does not mention: a judicial order could authorise including someone who was not on CONARC.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  2. CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP
Claim 17 clm-c41d730ae1aa3431 descriptive
the Legislature's oversight commission was never seated and the ombudsman's audit never happened
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
CELS lists both failures among the grounds of the ruling: "la no constitución de la Comisión Especial en la Legislatura de la CABA" and "la falta de informes por parte de la Defensoría del Pueblo CABA", alongside "la inexistencia de un estudio de impacto sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos previa implementación del SRFP".
Caveat
The ombudsman's office was not wholly inactive: the injunction records that it answered the court's requests for information and supplied documented cases of wrongful stops. What never happened was the standing oversight reporting the law envisaged.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA
Claim 18 clm-b44b2a7999396988 quantitative
so the nine million queries surfaced only once a court demanded the logs
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The injunction records that the judge ordered reports from the national bodies: "se requirieron informes al Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación y al Ministerio del Interior de la Nación – Registro Nacional de las Personas (ReNaPer)". CELS describes the same sequence and what it produced: "He then asked the National Registry of Persons (ReNaPeR) for the list of persons whose biometric data had been migrated to the City Government. This revealed that the City Police had made almost 10 million queries on 7.5 million people."
Caveat
The sources show the count emerged from records the court ordered produced. They do not establish that no other route could have surfaced it.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos
  2. CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP
Forensic record — source dossiers, gaps, hashes and the exact revision this page renders

This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.

unreviewed Revision 2026-08-23-full-claim-array effective 2026-07-26 · created 2026-08-23

Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.

sha256:5697047ab46321f8ba4699370cafe74710fba3a253394f7e1b25ee69ec04e8b2
Revision history → Permanent version link → Machine-readable record → Evidence Constitution →
18
of 18 claims mapped
11
source dossiers
11
publication dates recorded
1
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Governance facts carried by the record

Operator
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad, Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
Actor types
city-government
Funding model
public
Funding description
Not recorded
Cost
Not recorded
Ownership
Not recorded
Decision rights
Not recorded
Exit conditions
Not recorded

11 source dossiers

Human Rights Watch — letter to the Mayor of Buenos Aires on the facial recognition system and children's rights hrw.org · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-5a008cea7acdd15b
Publisher
Name not classified · hrw.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2020-10-09
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

9 Oct 2020. Sources the launch date ("began operating on April 24, 2019"), the ~300-camera deployment inside a network of nearly 13,000, and the mechanism: CONARC "lacks photographs of charged individuals, so the system pulls reference images from Argentina's population registry." Also the minors finding — "at least 166 children have been listed in CONARC between May 2017 and May 2020" — against the city's denial that CONARC held data on minors. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Chequeado — Por qué se suspendió el sistema de reconocimiento facial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires chequeado.com · 4 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-4a06621e66b52f31
Publisher
Name not classified · chequeado.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2022-04-21
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Independent Argentine fact-checking outlet. Carries the city's own claim verbatim — "1.695 personas fueron identificadas y puestas a disposición de la Justicia" — alongside the court's finding of "más de 9 millones de consultas" against a CONARC of "entre 35 mil y 40 mil registros", and the searches for the President, Vice-President, politicians, activists, judges and journalists. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
iJudicial (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad) — Suspenden el sistema de reconocimiento facial de prófugos ijudicial.gob.ar · 7 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-c6b5cb3942701c5a
Publisher
Name not classified · ijudicial.gob.ar
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2022-04-12
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
Open archived copy ↗ · 2026-04-11
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Dates the precautionary suspension to 12 April 2022 and names Judge Roberto Andrés Gallardo, Juzgado CAyT y de Relaciones de Consumo Nº 2. Other video-surveillance systems were left running; forensic audits of the equipment used to hold the migrated RENAPER data were ordered. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
CELS — Una jueza declaró inconstitucional el uso del sistema de reconocimiento facial en CABA cels.org.ar · 4 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-cbf1f9faf68b19c2
Publisher
Name not classified · cels.org.ar
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2022-09-07
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Litigant NGO, so read as a party — but it is the clearest statement of the grounds: the Comisión Especial de Seguimiento was never constituted in the Legislature, the Defensoría del Pueblo produced no reports, and no impact assessment preceded deployment. Dates the first-instance ruling 7 September 2022 (Judge Elena Liberatori). Fetched successfully. Date caveat: El Cohete a la Luna gives 28 September and the law firm Marval dates the judgment 26 October 2022 — the entry therefore says "September 2022" rather than a day.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Future of Privacy Forum — Judge declares Buenos Aires' Fugitive Facial Recognition System unconstitutional fpf.org · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-4c18dd5a3e423eaa
Publisher
Name not classified · fpf.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2022-09-30
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Independent legal analysis of the judgment; the sentence-level source for the exact figures used in impact — "9,392,372" biometric requests to RENAPER and "at least 15,459" searches of non-fugitives — and for the statutory frame (Leyes 5.688 and 6.339, Convention 108, art. 43 of the national Constitution). Also records the city's position that there were no wrongful detentions, against the Public Defender's documented one-to-three-hour detentions from false positives. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
CELS (English) — Court of Appeals confirms the unconstitutionality of the SRFP cels.org.ar · 4 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-fa52265be06569f4
Publisher
Name not classified · cels.org.ar
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2023-04-29
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Chamber I of the Court of Appeals, 28 April 2023, rejecting the appeals of the city government and the public prosecutor. Sets the three conditions on any restart: "establishment and proper functioning of oversight bodies", investigation of "differentiated impact depending on the personal features", and that the "system should be publicized and its operation should be reported". Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Marval O'Farrell Mairal — Se declara inconstitucional el Sistema de Reconocimiento Facial de Prófugos marval.com · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-af038f8fd0629145
Publisher
Name not classified · marval.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2022-10-26
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Law-firm analysis, used for the instruments actually applied: national data protection Law 25.326, the city's public-sector data protection Law 1.845, and Convention 108, plus the requirement of a data protection impact assessment before any re-implementation. Dates the judgment 26 October 2022, which conflicts with CELS and FPF — flagged rather than reconciled. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
elDiarioAR — La Justicia define si vuelve el reconocimiento facial en las calles de Buenos Aires eldiarioar.com · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-faa2431a6cf7f68e
Publisher
Name not classified · eldiarioar.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-02-19
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

19 Feb 2024, opinion/analysis. Confirms the system was still suspended and that an execution-of-judgment hearing was being held to fix audit conditions; notes the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy asked for an impact assessment during a visit. A vendor name (Danaide) appears here only and was not carried into the entry. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
El Cohete a la Luna — El panóptico porteño elcohetealaluna.com · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-e60817a15d3b52b2
Publisher
Name not classified · elcohetealaluna.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2025-10-12
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

12 Oct 2025 — the most recent confirmation located that the SRFP remains halted, and the clearest account of why: a deadlock over audit method, the city offering a black-box audit without source-code access while civil society demands scrutiny for bias and vulnerabilities. Politically committed outlet; used for status and the audit dispute, not for figures. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
El Grito del Sur — La Ciudad reaviva el ojo electrónico: reconocimiento facial y control social en CABA elgritodelsur.com.ar · background

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-e42b65b8a3725fd3
Publisher
Name not classified · elgritodelsur.com.ar
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2025-10-07
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

7 Oct 2025. Kept for one negative finding that prevents a false 'restart' claim: the 2025 facial-recognition purchase in Buenos Aires (Clearview AI, US$27,588) was made by the Ministerio Público Fiscal for images already in evidence, a different body and a different use from the SRFP's live street matching. Fetched successfully.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Background source; no baseline claim points here
Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) — #ConMiCaraNo adc.org.ar · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-fa2d7b47d06762ee
Publisher
Name not classified · adc.org.ar
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2019-05-23
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-07-26
Dossier created
2026-08-23
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Argentine civil-liberties organisation writing one month after launch, and the source for what the 300 cameras actually covered: they ran "en simultáneo" across "estaciones de la red de subtes como en la superficie" — subway stations and the surface alike, not the subway first.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Known limits of this passport
  • Publisher names and source languages have not yet been classified; domains are recorded without guessing.
  • Existing source notes are descriptive locators, not page- or paragraph-exact citations.
  • A missing archive, publication date or content hash is shown as null rather than inferred.
  • The project-level evidence grade ranks the strongest source in the entry; it is not a truth score for every claim.

Continue exploring

Compare this project

🇧🇷 Facial recognition in Rio: state police cameras, a city network that abstains · Rio de Janeiro Rio's state police match faces and publish no error rate; Buenos Aires's logs surfaced only when a judge demanded them, and it stopped. 🇺🇸 ShotSpotter Acoustic Gunshot Detection, In Service Since 2006 · Washington D.C. The audit that never happened: D.C. never ordered the review that ended Chicago's, and Buenos Aires never seated its statutory watchdog. 🇺🇸 Surveillance Technology Ordinance & Facial Recognition Ban · San Francisco San Francisco votes on surveillance before buying it; Buenos Aires deployed first and got its impact assessment ordered by a court.

Facial recognition on public cameras: what stopped it?

In four cities the cameras were already there and the face-matching layer was the question. Each was halted — by a different institution, on different grounds, and one of them was never switched on at all.

ProjectSinceStatusOutcomeEvidenceRun byCostWhat stopped it
Surveillance Technology Ordinance & Facial Recognition BanSan Francisco, 🇺🇸 2019 Live Scaled back Official City government not public The city stopped itself: an ordinance barred its own departments from face recognition and made every other surveillance tool pass a council vote.
Buenos Aires's Fugitive Facial Recognition System, stopped by the courtsBuenos Aires, 🇦🇷 2019 Suspended Failed Independent City government not public A court stopped it — on the city's own security law and the oversight bodies it never convened, rather than primarily on data protection.
Algorithms on Nice's cameras: the carnival face test and the school-gate system the courts stoppedNice, 🇫🇷 2019 Suspended Failed Independent City government not public The regulator asked the city to measure its own error rates, the city could not, and the highest administrative court then ended the practice for every French municipality.
112 Downtown Cameras, and the Ten Face-Matching Ones That Never Switched OnCampo Grande, 🇧🇷 2024 Live Scaled back Media City government not public Nothing stopped it, because it never started: the municipal guard holds no image database, and the data-sharing agreement was never signed.

Explore the wider context

📟 A Reading Is Not a Decision👁️ Who is allowed to watch?📖 Evidence brief📖 Adaptive traffic signals📖 Automated speed enforcement (speed cameras)
📎 Cite this project

1001 Smart Cities (2026). “Buenos Aires's Fugitive Facial Recognition System, stopped by the courts” — Buenos Aires, Argentina. The Smart City Atlas. https://1001smartcities.org/projects/buenos-aires-facial-recognition/ (last verified 2026-07-26). Data: CC BY 4.0.

The underlying data is free to reuse with attribution — see the open data page.

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