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In August 2016 Ports of Auckland, the company wholly owned by Auckland Council, announced it would partially automate its Fergusson Container Terminal by 2019
Permanent project revision
Revision 2026-10-15-baseline · effective 2026-10-15
Current revision. This is the snapshot used by the live entity page.
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sha256:ea6aa5149125bdddac49d81036af663e30b78a228cf1c1f476680d61b23c0803
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clm-1dcfc64d79024f32
quantitative
In August 2016 Ports of Auckland, the company wholly owned by Auckland Council, announced it would partially automate its Fergusson Container Terminal by 2019
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saying capacity would rise from just over 900,000 TEU a year to 1.6-1.7 million TEU without further reclamation
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The first phase went live in June 2020 with 27 automated Konecranes straddle carriers supervised by TBA software.
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On 17 June 2021 a software fault made a container carried by an automated straddle hit a stacked container, and automated operations were paused.
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In June 2022 the board cancelled the project because the system was not performing to expectations
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wrote off approximately $65 million, mainly the automation software and guidance system, and returned the terminal to fully manual operation
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The capacity gain did not arrive. The terminal handled 811,565 TEU in the year to June 2022, against 818,238 a year earlier and 973,722 in the year to June 2018.
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For the year to June 2022 the port reported a $10.3 million loss after a $63.1 million write-off on the project, against a $45.57 million profit the year before.
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The new wharf and cranes built alongside the automation were kept.
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The independent governance review the board commissioned at the council's request located the failure in procurement and oversight rather than in the machines
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the vendor selection process was not sufficiently well-structured, the chosen vendor had been working with the company as a consultant since 2012, the contract was negotiated without any adequate software performance guarantees
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the board did not take the steps necessary to understand the risks
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A council-ordered health and safety review had found in March 2021 that the automation project was unable to make a robust safety case for the automated straddles.
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Public ownership did not supply the missing check: under the Port Companies Act the shareholder has limited ability to intervene, and when the decision was made an intermediary company kept the port at arm's length from council oversight
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sha256:ea6aa5149125bdddac49d81036af663e30b78a228cf1c1f476680d61b23c0803
src-8bb8df7aeb4df847Trade-press report of the port's August 2016 announcement, quoting chief executive Tony Gibson: partial automation of the container terminal, complete in 2019, with automated straddle carriers working the truck grid and yard while stevedores keep driving between yard and cranes; capacity from just over 900,000 TEU to 1.6-1.7 million TEU a year because the port cannot expand through reclamation; around 50 stevedoring roles could go; the port's claim to be the first New Zealand port and only the third straddle-carrier terminal in the world to automate.
src-6a3d08de81dbf0f6The equipment supplier's release: the first phase went live in June 2020; by September 26 ships had been served by a blended fleet of 24 enhanced manual straddle carriers and 27 new automated Konecranes Noell straddle carriers, supervised through TBA's TEAMS equipment control system; it gives the capacity aim as about 900,000 to 1.4 million TEU a year. Vendor material, cited for the go-live date and fleet composition.
src-74a9b6f1c0fc1cd4Reports that phase one had handled over 100 ships but that speed and reliability were not yet up to expectations; that on 17 June 2021 a software fault caused a container carried by an automated straddle to hit a stacked container and the port paused automated operations; and the revised four-stage plan with a go-live judged achievable by late March 2022.
src-88011929c538f88dCarries the port's cancellation statement verbatim: the board chair's reasons (continuing delays, the system not performing to expectations, no confidence in timeline or cost to completion), two independent expert assessments that both said much more money and time were needed, the write-off of approximately $65 million 'mainly the automation software and guidance system', the retained new wharf and cranes, and the return to fully manual operation.
src-1ef4fe616c7c0f98The sole shareholder's statement on the day of cancellation: Mayor Phil Goff calls it wasted expenditure of around $65 million, says the board is responsible under the Port Companies Act and the shareholder has limited ability to intervene, that Auckland Council Investments Ltd kept the port at arm's length at the time of the decision, and asks the board for a review of the process.
src-f9dea3cdd2c60db6Reports the annual result for the year to 30 June 2022: a $10.3 million loss against a $45.57 million profit a year earlier, after a $63.1 million write-off on the axed automation project.
src-7d0a8ff821aa866dSame annual result, adding container volume: 811,565 TEU in the year to June 2022 against 818,238 a year earlier.
src-4c9d89e8821bf94eQuotes the independent governance review by Mark Binns, appointed by the port board at the council's request: vendor selection not sufficiently well-structured, an unsatisfactory business case, a contract without adequate software performance guarantees, a chosen vendor that had worked for the port as a consultant since 2012, lacking governance around contractual milestones, and the conclusion that the board did not take the steps necessary.
src-9c65a6ec936d3adcA research report commissioned by the dockworkers' section of a global transport union federation, published by the Maritime Union of New Zealand. Cited for its quotation of the March 2021 council-ordered health and safety review ('the automation project is unable to make a robust safety case'), its statement that no one was hurt by the automated straddles, and its table of the port's container volumes, 973,722 TEU in the year to June 2018. An advocate's account; its cost estimates are not used here.
src-5d7d0d08013d260cInterview with former chief executive Tony Gibson, who rejects the Binns review point by point: he says the reviewer did not interview the software vendor TBA and that software performance guarantees of the kind expected do not exist in the ports industry; the article describes the review as a two-and-a-half-page summary and quotes its finding that changing the acceptance testing was 'incomprehensible'.