1001 Smart Cities

Permanent project revision

TraceTogether & SafeEntry Digital Contact Tracing

Revision 2026-08-27-source-dating · effective 2026-08-26

Current revision. This is the snapshot used by the live entity page.

unreviewed

Every source on this entry now carries a date key: a publication date where the publisher states one, otherwise an explicit null with the reason on the record.

sha256:fc1f169d447fbd14561540065fc7bf0f3555f65e861d0871ccdf8358621dfd72
All revisions → Current entity page →

Change set

  • replace /snapshot/projectFingerprint — Updated projectFingerprint to the current sourced project record.
  • replace /snapshot/sources — Updated sources to the current sourced project record.
10
of 10 claims mapped
5
source dossiers
3
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Claims, one by one

The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.

Claim 1 clm-5672230b713d8c60 quantitative
used Bluetooth proximity (the open-sourced BlueTrace protocol) and QR-code logging for COVID-19 contact tracing from March 2020
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The agency's own account describes the BlueTrace protocol Singapore built and open-sourced and why it stayed with it; the discontinuation notice describes TraceTogether and SafeEntry together as the country's digital contact tracing systems.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. GovTech: Two reasons why Singapore is sticking with TraceTogether's protocol
  2. MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry
Claim 2 clm-e5d100fa5dff701c quantitative
Adoption reached 70% (3.8 million users) by December 2020
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The ministry's release is headed 'TraceTogether Adoption Surpasses 70% - CCs to Re-open For Token Collection Progressively' and dates the milestone to December 2020 in its own text.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MDDI: TraceTogether Adoption Surpasses 70%
Claim 3 clm-99c236180ee4a504 quantitative
Contact tracing ended in February 2023, the systems were declared no longer required after 5 January 2024, and the data was deleted on 1 February 2024
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The discontinuation notice: the ministers 'determined that these digital contact tracing systems would no longer be required after 5 January 2024', and 'As of 1 February 2024, all COVID-19 related personal contact tracing data derived from TT and SE has been deleted'. The parliamentary question frames the contact tracing period as 'between March 2020 and 13 February 2023'.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry
  2. MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost
Claim 4 clm-003539d0bd141c66 quantitative
after a 2021 controversy over police access
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The January 2021 report set out that police could access TraceTogether data despite earlier assurances; the discontinuation notice records the response, Part 11 of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act, enacted in February 2021 to limit use to contact tracing 'or for criminal investigations and proceedings in respect of serious offences'.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MIT Technology Review: Broken promises — how Singapore lost trust on contact-tracing privacy
  2. MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry
Claim 5 clm-1b324cbb12c19f52 quantitative
The health ministry estimates about 600,000 quarantine orders were issued with TraceTogether supplementing conventional contact tracing
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Verbatim: 'We estimate that about 600,000 quarantine orders were issued, with TraceTogether supplementing conventional contact tracing methods.'
Caveat
An estimate, and one the ministry says it can no longer check: the programme's detailed records were deleted.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost
Claim 6 clm-893fed8051901c49 quantitative
puts the total programme cost, app and tokens together, at about $180 million, the majority of it the tokens
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Verbatim: 'The total cost of the TraceTogether Programme, including development of the TraceTogether App for handphones and the provision of TraceTogether Tokens, was about $180 million. Majority of the cost was incurred for the TraceTogether Tokens'.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost
Claim 7 clm-24d3c6df59313b51 quantitative
Adoption had passed 70%, some 3.8 million users, by December 2020
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The ministry's own milestone release on adoption surpassing 70%.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MDDI: TraceTogether Adoption Surpasses 70%
Claim 8 clm-0501ae2f40665677 quantitative
The data was deleted on 1 February 2024, all of it but the records of one 2020 murder case, which the police keep
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Verbatim: 'All COVID-19 related personal contact tracing data derived from TraceTogether and SafeEntry deleted as of 1 February 2024, with the exception of the TraceTogether data pertaining to a murder case in May 2020', which 'will be retained by the Singapore Police'.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry
Claim 9 clm-859eaea102f05279 descriptive
the health ministry replied that it no longer has the detailed data because the records were deleted when the programme stood down, and could only estimate
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The question asked how many cases identified by contact tracing 'would not have been identified through conventional contact tracing methods'. The answer opens: 'We no longer have detailed data on the TraceTogether Programme as records have all been deleted when we stood down the programme.'
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost
Claim 10 clm-d02626b24cc41901 descriptive
Deleting the data kept the promise and destroyed the evidence
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The two sit together in the record: the discontinuation notice is the promise kept, and the parliamentary answer is what it cost - a question about the programme's contribution that the ministry cannot answer from data it no longer holds.
Caveat
The entry's own reading of the two documents side by side; neither source draws this conclusion.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost
  2. MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry

Source dossiers and revision state

This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.

unreviewed Revision 2026-08-27-source-dating effective 2026-08-26 · created 2026-08-27

Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.

sha256:fc1f169d447fbd14561540065fc7bf0f3555f65e861d0871ccdf8358621dfd72
Revision history → Permanent version link → Machine-readable record → Evidence Constitution →
10
of 10 claims mapped
5
source dossiers
3
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Governance facts carried by the record

Operator
GovTech Singapore
Actor types
national-government
Funding model
public
Funding description
Singapore government (Ministry of Health / GovTech / Smart Nation and Digital Government Office)
Cost
SGD 180 million (total programme lifetime cost, mostly TraceTogether Tokens; per Ministry of Health)
Ownership
Not recorded
Decision rights
Not recorded
Exit conditions
Not recorded

5 source dossiers

MDDI: Discontinuation of TraceTogether and SafeEntry mddi.gov.sg · 5 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-b01206a8312ffe38
Publisher
Name not classified · mddi.gov.sg
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-02-05
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-26
Dossier created
2026-08-27
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The formal end of both systems: the date after which they were no longer required, and what was deleted and what was kept.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
MDDI: TraceTogether Adoption Surpasses 70% mddi.gov.sg · 2 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-6ed2968d70db53b3
Publisher
Name not classified · mddi.gov.sg
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2020-12-23
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-26
Dossier created
2026-08-27
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The adoption milestone announcement. No publication date is shown on the page. The release is dated 23 December 2020.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
MOH: Assessing TraceTogether's Contribution and Total Programme Cost moh.gov.sg · 5 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-995ec859d9863fa4
Publisher
Name not classified · moh.gov.sg
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-26
Dossier created
2026-08-27
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The health ministry's answer to a parliamentary question on what TraceTogether achieved and what it cost. No publication date is shown on the page. No publication date is recorded for this page.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
GovTech: Two reasons why Singapore is sticking with TraceTogether's protocol tech.gov.sg · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-0421a3bc8b412021
Publisher
Name not classified · tech.gov.sg
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-26
Dossier created
2026-08-27
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The agency's account of why Singapore kept its own BlueTrace protocol. No publication date is shown on the page. The page states no publication date.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
MIT Technology Review: Broken promises — how Singapore lost trust on contact-tracing privacy technologyreview.com · 1 linked claim

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-d48e36dbc4790f11
Publisher
Name not classified · technologyreview.com
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2021-01-11
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-26
Dossier created
2026-08-27
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Independent press: 2021 police-access controversy and legislative fix

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Known limits of this passport
  • Publisher names and source languages have not yet been classified; domains are recorded without guessing.
  • Existing source notes are descriptive locators, not page- or paragraph-exact citations.
  • A missing archive, publication date or content hash is shown as null rather than inferred.
  • The project-level evidence grade ranks the strongest source in the entry; it is not a truth score for every claim.