1001 Smart Cities
🇷🇺 Moscow

Remote Electronic Voting (DEG)

🤖 AI-generated summary of the sources below · 🔎 Last verified · ◆ 14 sourced claims, none individually verified yet

This overview was generated with AI from the public sources listed below and checked against them before publication. It has not had a complete human fact-check — treat it as a starting point and follow the sources.

How this atlas is made · What “last verified” means · What “source-checked” means · The full record behind this page

✎ Updated 20 Aug 2026 Publication date recorded for 6 sources. What changed →

Moscow has run its own online voting system, separate from Russia's federal platform, since a September 2019 pilot in three City Duma districts — a system whose encryption cryptographers Pierrick Gaudry and Alexander Golovnev broke twice during its public pre-election testing. In the September 2021 State Duma election, candidates backed by the opposition led in eight of Moscow's fifteen districts on paper ballots; the online tally appeared only the next morning and reversed the outcome in every district. By March 2024 about 71 percent of Moscow voters cast their ballots online, Novaya Gazeta Europe documented a simultaneous surge of electronic votes across Russia's time zones at 9:30 Moscow time, and the city made electronic terminals the default at polling stations, with paper ballots on request.

Live 📅 since 2019
Outcome🔄 Ongoing
Evidence🔬 Peer-reviewed
what does this mean?The strongest source behind this entry is an independent peer-reviewed or academic study. It grades who did the looking — not how well the project went. All four grades →
Run byMoscow Department of Information Technology with the Moscow City Election Commission
Scale🏙️ City-wide
FundingMoscow city budget

📊 Impact

A technical audit collated by the Russian Election Monitor found Moscow's 2021 online vote recorded more ballots received (2,021,969) than issued (1,943,590) and concluded the published data could not reproduce the official result; in 2024, The Bell reported Vladimir Putin polling 76.8 percent at Moscow's physical stations and 89 percent online.

🎓 Lesson

The test of online voting is whether outsiders can recompute the result from the data they are shown. Moscow's system is the standing counterexample: broken by cryptographers before its first election, irreproducible for observers in 2021, anomalous again in 2024.

🏛️ GovernanceDigital governmentCitizen participation

Sources

↗ Gaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryptionPublished August 2019Cryptographic analysis breaking two successive versions of the 2019 Moscow system's encryption during public testing; later published at the Financial Cryptography 2020 conference.
↗ ACF — falsification of remote electronic voting, Moscow 2021The Anti-Corruption Foundation's analysis site on the 2021 Moscow DEG results reversal; opposition-run project, methodology published.
↗ Russian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical auditPublished 7 October 2021Independent technical review: ballots issued (1,943,590) versus received (2,021,969); public data insufficient to reproduce official results.
↗ Novaya Gazeta Europe — 'Fake it till you make it'Published 21 March 2024March 2024 investigation: simultaneous 9:30 a.m. surge of e-votes across all time zones in the presidential election.
↗ The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulationPublished 10 July 2024Overview with the 2024 Moscow numbers: ~71 percent voting online; Putin at 76.8 percent offline versus 89 percent online.
Show 1 more sourcesShow fewer
↗ Carnegie Politika — Moscow techno-votingPublished 26 July 2024July 2024 analysis: Moscow's system distinct from the federal DEG; terminals made the default at polling stations, paper on request.

📅 How old is the evidence?

Two clocks, kept apart: when this entry’s sources were published, and what has happened to its record in the atlas. Documented span: since 2019. 5 of 6 sources carry a publication date, from August 2019 to 26 July 2024.

When the sources were published

  1. arXiv (preprint repository) · researchGaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryption
  2. Russian Election Monitor · ngoRussian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical audit
  3. Novaya Gazeta Europe · pressNovaya Gazeta Europe — 'Fake it till you make it'
  4. The Bell · pressThe Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation
  5. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace · researchCarnegie Politika — Moscow techno-voting

Every source, with links ↑

What happened to this record

  1. Entered the record
  2. Sources last read
  3. Publication date recorded for 6 sources

Every revision, permanent →

Show your work What this page rests on and what it can’t tell you · all 14 claims with their sources · the forensic record

Evidence Passport · public beta 14 addressable claims, 6 source dossiers, one permanent baseline. The passport is unreviewed — an AI-assisted structural migration, not a human or expert endorsement. Every revision keeps a permanent copy under revision history.

Inspect the claims, one by one — verbatim text, sources and caveats for all 14

The text below is copied verbatim from the published record. Each claim names the source dossiers that carry it; caveats stay attached to the claim they qualify.

Claim 1 clm-4aef833b0ae4738f quantitative
since a September 2019 pilot in three City Duma districts
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The cryptographic paper analyses the system built for the September 2019 Moscow City Duma election; overview accounts record the pilot's three-district scope.
Caveat
The three-district scope rests on later overview accounts rather than a primary election-commission document.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Gaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryption
  2. Carnegie Politika — Moscow techno-voting
Claim 2 clm-6acec7abf2f8a15b descriptive
separate from Russia's federal platform
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The Carnegie analysis describes Moscow's own system running independently of the federal DEG platform.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Carnegie Politika — Moscow techno-voting
Claim 3 clm-38e7c4a3feb2015a descriptive
encryption cryptographers Pierrick Gaudry and Alexander Golovnev broke twice during its public pre-election testing
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The paper documents breaking the first encryption scheme and then the revised one issued in response, both during the pre-election public testing period.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Gaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryption
Claim 4 clm-f2765fa452dc84ba descriptive
led in eight of Moscow's fifteen districts on paper ballots
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The fraud-analysis project and later overviews record opposition-backed candidates leading in eight of fifteen Moscow districts before online votes were added.
Caveat
The ACF is an opposition-run project; its raw-data methodology is published but has no official counterpart.

Sources carrying this claim

  1. ACF — falsification of remote electronic voting, Moscow 2021
  2. The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation
Claim 5 clm-3d1f308934d5807b descriptive
the online tally appeared only the next morning and reversed the outcome in every district
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Both accounts record the delayed publication of the online results and the reversal of all fifteen district outcomes.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. ACF — falsification of remote electronic voting, Moscow 2021
  2. The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation
Claim 6 clm-a4c40efcd03555e8 quantitative
about 71 percent of Moscow voters cast their ballots online
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The Bell reports roughly 71 percent of Moscow's March 2024 voters voting online.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation
Claim 7 clm-834c35edec21d17f quantitative
a simultaneous surge of electronic votes across Russia's time zones at 9:30 Moscow time
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The investigation found every time zone showing a sharp e-vote increase at 9:30 a.m. Moscow time — unnatural across eleven time zones.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Novaya Gazeta Europe — 'Fake it till you make it'
Claim 8 clm-37748538a39601fe descriptive
made electronic terminals the default at polling stations, with paper ballots on request
Published field
snippet · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
Carnegie's analysis records Moscow's 2024 switch to terminal voting as the polling-station default, with paper available on request.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Carnegie Politika — Moscow techno-voting
Claim 9 clm-e8de2827e22df82d quantitative
more ballots received (2,021,969) than issued (1,943,590)
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The technical review's headline discrepancy: 1,943,590 electronic ballots issued against 2,021,969 recorded as received.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Russian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical audit
Claim 10 clm-ee62619dc0a895ec descriptive
the published data could not reproduce the official result
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The review concluded the publicly released data was insufficient to recompute the official online-vote results.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Russian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical audit
Claim 11 clm-0ce64fefc31fbe9d quantitative
76.8 percent at Moscow's physical stations and 89 percent online
Published field
impact · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The Bell reports Putin's 2024 Moscow share: 76.8 percent at physical polling stations against 89 percent in the online vote.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation
Claim 12 clm-a6a9f79bdb65cef9 descriptive
broken by cryptographers before its first election
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The encryption breaks were demonstrated during public testing ahead of the September 2019 vote.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Gaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryption
Claim 13 clm-cdf66f85d114309b quantitative
irreproducible for observers in 2021
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The 2021 technical review found observers could not recompute the official result from the released data.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Russian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical audit
Claim 14 clm-f038b635fe5811aa quantitative
anomalous again in 2024
Published field
lesson · verbatim
Mapping
mapped · no interpretation or interpolation added by this passport
What the mapping says
The 2024 investigation documented the synchronized e-vote surge across time zones.
Caveat
No claim-specific caveat recorded

Sources carrying this claim

  1. Novaya Gazeta Europe — 'Fake it till you make it'
Forensic record — source dossiers, gaps, hashes and the exact revision this page renders

This layer records what is known about each source, what is still missing, and the exact snapshot this page is rendering. A missing date, archive or hash stays visible as missing.

unreviewed Revision 2026-08-20-source-dates-b2 effective 2026-08-15 · created 2026-08-20

Awaiting operator and domain-expert review; publication of this revision implies neither.

sha256:e56916112f27787bf2cfeff26e55b7415a2618e8937793a09077241fb7b61cc6
Revision history → Permanent version link → Machine-readable record → Evidence Constitution →
14
of 14 claims mapped
6
source dossiers
4
publication dates recorded
0
archives linked
0
exact locators
0
content captures hashed

Governance facts carried by the record

Operator
Moscow Department of Information Technology with the Moscow City Election Commission
Actor types
city-government
Funding model
public
Funding description
Moscow city budget
Cost
Not recorded
Ownership
Not recorded
Decision rights
Not recorded
Exit conditions
Not recorded

6 source dossiers

Gaudry & Golovnev — breaking the Moscow internet voting encryption arxiv.org · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-e0befd1f5762b497
Publisher
Name not classified · arxiv.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Cryptographic analysis breaking two successive versions of the 2019 Moscow system's encryption during public testing; later published at the Financial Cryptography 2020 conference.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
ACF — falsification of remote electronic voting, Moscow 2021 electionfraud2021.acf.international · 2 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-abe61e8f808b660a
Publisher
Name not classified · electionfraud2021.acf.international
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
Not recorded
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

The Anti-Corruption Foundation's analysis site on the 2021 Moscow DEG results reversal; opposition-run project, methodology published.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Russian Election Monitor — first findings of the technical audit russian-election-monitor.org · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-8bc76643907eb446
Publisher
Name not classified · russian-election-monitor.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2021-10-07
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Independent technical review: ballots issued (1,943,590) versus received (2,021,969); public data insufficient to reproduce official results.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Novaya Gazeta Europe — 'Fake it till you make it' novayagazeta.eu · 2 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-d61cfb15f8809196
Publisher
Name not classified · novayagazeta.eu
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-03-21
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

March 2024 investigation: simultaneous 9:30 a.m. surge of e-votes across all time zones in the presidential election.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
The Bell — online voting, electronic manipulation en.thebell.io · 4 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-317fd2aef32a0aed
Publisher
Name not classified · en.thebell.io
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-07-10
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

Overview with the 2024 Moscow numbers: ~71 percent voting online; Putin at 76.8 percent offline versus 89 percent online.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Carnegie Politika — Moscow techno-voting carnegieendowment.org · 3 linked claims

Open original source ↗

Stable source ID
src-471fc0e405fafe90
Publisher
Name not classified · carnegieendowment.org
Type / language
web-page · language not classified
Published
2024-07-26
Updated
Not recorded
Source last checked
No source-level check date
Record last verified
2026-08-15
Dossier created
2026-08-20
Retrieved copy
No local capture recorded
Archive
No archived copy linked
Content hash
No captured content hash
Locator
Open the recorded source note

July 2024 analysis: Moscow's system distinct from the federal DEG; terminals made the default at polling stations, paper on request.

Descriptive only — not page/paragraph exact
Claims linked
Known limits of this passport
  • Publisher names and source languages have not yet been classified; domains are recorded without guessing.
  • Existing source notes are descriptive locators, not page- or paragraph-exact citations.
  • A missing archive, publication date or content hash is shown as null rather than inferred.
  • The project-level evidence grade ranks the strongest source in the entry; it is not a truth score for every claim.

Continue exploring

Compare this project

🇪🇸 Decidim Participation Platform · Barcelona Decidim's code is open and auditable; Moscow's DEG is the counterexample researchers cite — observers could not recompute its results. 🇨🇴 Presupuesto Participativo & Digital Voting (medellindecide.co) · Medellín Both cities vote online at scale: Medellín's budget votes verify identity biometrically; Moscow's tallies defied observer recomputation. 🇷🇺 mos.ru — Moscow's E-Government Portal · Moscow Voting rides the same mos.ru accounts as the e-government portal — one login for city services and, since 2019, for elections.

Explore the wider context

🗺️ Your City's Problem Map Is Really a Map of Who Complains🪪 Digital government guide🏙️ Moscow city profile🏛️ Governance projects📖 Civic participation platform📖 Digital identity📖 Government super-app
📎 Cite this project

1001 Smart Cities (2026). “Remote Electronic Voting (DEG)” — Moscow, Russia. The Smart City Atlas. https://1001smartcities.org/projects/moscow-remote-electronic-voting/ (last verified 2026-08-15). Data: CC BY 4.0.

The underlying data is free to reuse with attribution — see the open data page.

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